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COMPENSATION FOR A PARTIAL TAKING OF PROPERTY:
BALANCING FACTORS IN EMINENT DOMAIN*
THE physical expansion of urban areas can pose conflicts with property
owners unwilling to follow the trend towards urbanization. While improving
a road in a deVeloping suburban area near Nashville, the county diverted a
stream from land used as a riding academy. This diversion rendered use of the
land for this purpose more difficult, but did not affect the market value of the
property. Measured by the value placed on the property by the owner-a sub-
jective standard-he has been damaged by the actioi of the county; according
to the objective standard of the market place, there was no damage. In the
eminent domain proceeding arising from the diversion of the stream, the court
a6plied a market value measure to this partial taking of property being used
at less than its highest economic use ;' it concluded that no compensation need
be paid. This result seems inconsistent with the social interest in minimizing
the effect of government action on property rights.
A central value in our system of private property is the freedom of the in-
dividual property owner to use and dispose of his property as he sees fit.-
Courts, in scrutinizing governmental restrictions on the use of property, have
traditionally afforded substantial protection to individual volition in the use of
private property. Thus, exercises of the police power restricting the utilization
bf property must be found to be reasonable.8 Although eminent domain-the
power of government to compel the sale of private property-represents a
*Evans v. Wheeler, 348 S.W.2d 500 (Tenn. 1961).
1. The highest use of land is the use for which the property is suitable that would
command the highest price in the market place. In the instant case, the land involved had
a highest use as a residential subdivision. The present use-a riding academy-is a less-
than-highest use.
2. Men have various interests in land. Important among these is the interest in its
exclusive possession free from interferences by physical intrusions of others or things
controlled or set in motion by them. The interests in quiet enjoyment and exclusive
use of land and structures on it are the oldest interests recognized and protected by
the common law. Anglo-Americans and, indeed, citizens of most civilized nations
like to feel that their land is their own and that they can do as they please with It.
This, of Course, is not, and for that matter never has been literally true, for the
- obvious reason that society must regulate and control the use made by one person
of his property'so that undue injury may not be caused to others. Nevertlhlecss, the
interest of a possessor in his land has, from the beginning, received very wide legal
protection.
1 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 1.1 at 4 (1956).
The most obvious restriction on unfettered private volition is that property cannot be
used illegally, and that an illegal use will not be protected. Musco v. Torelo, 102 Conn. 346,
128 AtI. 645 (1925). Nor can property be used in such a way as to be a nuisance. May'
flower Holding Co. v. Warrick, 143 Fla. 125, 196 So. 428 (1940).
3. Compare Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), ivith Nectow
v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
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shortcut by which the community can attain potentially expensive goals at a
reasonable cost,4 the prerequisites to the exercise of the power-that it be used
for a public purpose and that just compensation be paid r-show that it also
represents a balance between the needs of the community and the protection
of private property.
Once property has been taken, the requirement of just compensation means
that concepts of property rights and protection of these rights must find their
equivalent in the determination of property value.0 Ideally, compensation should
restore the owner of the taken property to the same position he would have
occupied had his property not been taken.7 Since the value of the taking may
4. Eminent domain is a "shortcut" in that it allows the community to determine what
property it needs and then to take that property despite the wishes of the owner, subject
to the requirement that the owner be paid a fair price for what is taken. The power of
eminent domain is an inherent power of sovereignty. Johnson v. Joliet & C.R.R., 23 Ill. 202
(1859). The power can be used by federal, state, and local governments, as well as by a
large variety of specialized local governmental bodies, such as sewage and park districts,
and by some public utilities. See 1 NicHOLS, EmNENr Dom u §§ 3.1-3232 (3d ed. 1950).
[Hereinafter cited as NicoLs.]
5. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The requirement that the taking be for a public purpose is implicit
in the first clause of the guarantee. For a list of uses that fall within public purpose, see
JxAu, E=N=NT DomAn 22-25 (1953) [hereinafter cited as JAuR]. State constitutional
and statutory requirements relating to eminent domain are collected in Appendix, 48 VA.
L. REv. 548 (1962).
6. This function of compensation in eminent domain is recognized by so early a com-
mentator as Blackstone.
So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not
authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole
community. If a new road, for instance, were to be made through the grounds of a
private person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to the public; but the law
permits no man, or set of men, to do this without consent of the owner of the land.
In vain it may be urged, that the good of the individual ought to yield to that of the
community; for it would be dangerous to allow any private man, or even any public
tribunal, to be the judge of this common, good, and to decide whether it be epedient
or no. Besides, the public good is in nothing more essentially interested, than in the
protection of every individual's private rights, as modelled by the municipal law.
In this and similar cases the legislature alone can, and indeed frequently does, inter-
pose, and compel the individual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and compel?
Not by absolutely stripping the subject of his property in an arbitrary manner; but
by giving him a full indemnification- and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained
* All the legislature does is to oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for
a reasonable price....
I BLAcx:STONF., CommEa=Arams 139 (1758).
7. Such compensation means the full and perfect equivalent in money of the property
taken. The owner is to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as he would have
occupied if his property had not been taken.
United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1942). The difficulty of accurately evaluating
property in terms of money is illustrated by the established practice of granting specific
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differ as between the owner and the taker, the courts have sought a measure
of compensation that is fair to both, and have often, but not always, rejected
the subjective standards of "value to the taker" and "value to the owner." 8 The
objective standard generally adopted, market value, in which a natural bargain-
ing situation is approximated by positing a voluntary seller and a voluntary
buyer,9 often affords adequate protection to the property owner, regardless of
his use of the property prior to the taking. For example, where the government
takes an entire tract of land-a total taking-the owner would be paid an
amount based upon the highest or most profitable use to which the property
could be put, regardless of actual use. Thus, the property owner is in no way
"penalized" for using his land at less than its most economic use.10 Since the
market value standard is only an incantation, and not a rigid definition,11
performance of almost all contracts to convey land. See, e.g., Gartrell v. Stafford, 12 Neb.
545, 11 N.W. 732 (1882).
8. Value to the taker has been universally rejected as a standard. 1 ORGEL, VALUATION
UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN § 81 (2d ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as ORGEL]; 4 NICHOLS
§ 12.21. If value to the taker were to be used as the standard of compensation, the advan-
tage that the eminent domain power gives to the government in fulfilling its obligations,
the advantage of avoiding the open market, would be all but lost. Value to the owner has
usually been rejected, too, for it is open to the subjective influences of human, irrationalities
on the one hand, and often closely approximated by market value on the other. See 1 OaR0L
§§ 66-80; 4 NicHoLs § 1222; 1 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 66-97 (1937).
9. The creation of a bargaining situation between a willing seller, not forced to sell,
and a willing buyer, not compelled to purchase, is intended to prevent the setting of value
in terms of the seller having to make a forced sale, or of the buyer being "held-up" because
of his need for the property. It has also been used to apply the market value standard to
property for which there is no market, by assuming that such a market does exist. 1 BoN-
BRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 8, at 59-61; see 4 NicHoLs § 12.2[1] ; 1 ORGEL §§ 22-23.
10. The requirement that market value be computed in view of all reasonably probable
uses recognizes that the present use of property does not alone determine its value.
The sum required to be paid the owner does not depend upon the uses to which he
has devoted his land but is to be arrived at upon just consideration, of all the uses
for which it is suitable. The highest and most profitable use for which the property
is adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future is to be
considered, not necessarily as the measure of value, but to the full extent that the
prospect of demand for such use affects the market value while the property is pri-
vately held.
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934). For example, if a man owned land that
he used as a farm, and that land was known to contain a gold mine, its price on the open
market would be determined by its value as a gold mine, its highest use, rather than by
its value as a farm. See 1 ORGEL § 20.
11. See 1 ORGEL § 15 at 79.
It must also be remembered that market value is an approximation, rather than ao exact
measure, of the cash exchange value of property. Cases in which there are large differences
in the estimates of the market value of property are common. See, e.g., Oklahoma City v.
Wilson, 310 P.2d 369, 372 (Okla. 1957) ($4,200 as against $42,400) ; State Roads Comm'n
v. Nevosel, 203 Md. 619, 625-26, 102 A.2d 563, 566 (1954) ($2,000 as against $54,348). A
more striking example of the inexact nature of market value can be derived from ten cases
[Vol. 72: 392
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courts are able to find in it a flexibility which allows them to arrive at a fair
result in most situations. So, in a partial taking situation, where the sum of the
individual values of the component parts does not equal the value of the whole,
the property owner is compensated for the value he has lost-i.e., the value of
the part taken, plus damages to the remainder, or the value of the whole tract
before the taking, minus the value of the remainder after the taking-rather than
for the market value of what was taken.' Furthermore, although compensating
the property owner for interference with a particular use of property is anath-
ema in the law of eminent domain,13 the market value used is nevertheless
often computed "in view of the adaptability of the property for a special use."
This use is usually the use to which the property is in fact being put. For ex-
passed upon by the Governor's Council of Massachusetts in December, 1957, in all of which
appraisals were made by outside appraisers called in by the state.
Lower Appraisal Higher Appraisal % Difference










(Figures taken from weekly calendars of Governor's Council meetings, Dec. 1, 1956-Jan.
2, 1957.)
12. For example, a farm might have a market value of $10,000, while each of its halves
would be worth only $3,000 if sold separately. The market value of a half would thus be
$3,000, while its value to the owner of the farm, and the extent of his injury if it were
taken, would be $7,000. See 1 ORGar. § 52; 4 NicROLS § 14.1[2].
Three methods of calculating severance damages in such cases have been used. The
usual method is to compute the market value of the part taken plus the damages to the
remainder. 1 ORGEL § 51; JAMR 136. The other method commonly used involves measur-
ing the difference between the fair market value of the property before and after the taking.
1 ORGEL § 50; JAHR 136-38. A third method, first used in Louisiana Soc'y v. Board of
Levee Comm'rs, 143 La. 90, 78 So. 249 (1918), has little practical significance. See 1 OnGEL
8 49; JAHR 138.
13. And this just compensation, it will be noticed, is for the property, and not to the
owner. Every other clause in this Fifth Amendment is personal. "No person shall be
held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime," etc. Instead of continuing
that form of statement, and saying that no person shall be deprived of his property
without just compensation, the personal element is left out, and the "just compen-
sation" is to be a full equivalent for the property taken.
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893). This interpretation
of the protection afforded by the fifth amendment, an, interpretation still adhered to, elimi-
nates as an element of compensation injury to such "personal" factors as the use being
made of property. See generally ORGEL §§ 2-3. But see Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases
of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE LJ. 221, 257-58 (1931) ("The decision as to whether com-
pensation should be made generally has been reached, however, upon purely legalistic
grounds with a physical conception of the eminent domain process in mind.").
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ample, in Housing Authority of Bridgeport v. Lustig,14 the court, although
stating that the owner may not be compensated for injury to the property's
use as a slaughterhouse, held that the fact the property was used to conduct a
slaughterhouse justified an award of $18,309. The value of the property, ill the
absence of the established business, was found to be $8,309.15 Finally, where
there is no available market for the property taken, or where the market value
standard would lead to a grossly inequitable result, courts abandon the market
value standard altogether, claiming to compensate the owner for the "intrinsic
value of the property,"' 6 its value to the owner,17 or the cost of preventing
14. 139 Conn. 73, 90 A.2d 169 (1952).
15. The verbal efforts of the courts to maintain the classic dichotomy of eminent
domain law between use and property, first set forth by Mr. Justice Brewer in Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. United States, note 13 supra, reach a confusing extreme in cases similar
to Lustig. Thus, in Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341 (1925), the Court stated:
The special value of the land due to its adaptability for use in a particular business
is an element which the owner of land is entitled ... to have considered in determin-
ing the amount paid as just compensation....
Id. at 344-45. But the Court also ruled that the destruction of the business that resulted
from the taking was an unintended incident of the taking, and was not an element of com-
pensation.
Similar, and no more meaningful, distinctions can be found in many cases in- which the
use of the property is not particularly extraordinary. An example of such a case is Causby
v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 751 (Ct. Cl. 1945), ret'd on other grounds, 328 U.S. 256
(1946). Causby's property was used as a chicken farm, over which Air Force planes flew
frequently at low altitude. The court held that there was a taking of property. On the
measure of damages, the court said:
Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover for the damage to their business, but they are
entitled to recover the special value of the land due to its adaptability for use for this
business.
60 F. Supp. at 758. It appears difficult to conceive of Causby's property having any unique
value because of its ability to be used as a chicken farm. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed
on other grounds, without discussing the issue of damages. United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946). See also Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Culver, 80 N.W.2d 541 (N.D.
1957), in which evidence of the contour plowing method used was allowed as evidentiary
of the value of the property taken by condemning a power line easement through a farm.
16. Lower Colorado River Authority v. Hughes, 122 S.W.2d 222, 223 (Tex. Civ. App.
1938) :
Appellees alleged and tried their case on the theory that the property had no market
value, but that it had an actual, reasonable or intrinsic value; and the rule is settled
that when property taken. or destroyed has no market value, its actual, reasonable,
or intrinsic value may be shown.
The idea that property has an intrinsic value seems to conflict with the concept of market
value providing the best measure of the value of property. Intrinsic value is frequently
equated with value to the owner.
17. See, e.g., Board of Park Comm'rs of City of Wichita v. Fitch, 184 Kans. 508, 337
P.2d 1034 (1959) (tract containing two lakes and a sandy beach) ; State v. Dunclick, Inc.,
77 Idaho 45, 286 P2d 1112 (1955) (storage land of manufacturing plant; lower court
opinion reversed on other grounds) ; Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. Pittsburg, Ft. W., & C.
Ry., 216 Ill. 575, 75 N.E. 248 (1905) (part of freight terminal) ; also see 4 NICHOLS § 12.32;
1 ORGEL §§ 39-42.
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damage to the owner.'8 Thus, where the property condemned was an expen-
sive house in a run-down neighborhood, it was held that, in fixing compensa-
tion, "the intrinsic value, or its value to the owner must be taken into con-
sideration; otherwise he might be deprived of his property without just and
reasonable compensation."' 9 In these situations cost of construction, loss of
profits, and cost of repair are taken into account in determining the amount
of the award.
Evans v. Wheeler 20 presents another situation where compensation in terms
of market value presents difficulties. Jay Evans owned seventy acres of land
on the outskirts of Nashville. On the western side of a bisecting road he
- -- - $Ag.,wL Jr~
operated a farm; on the east, a riding academy. A stream, Cooper Creek, ran
through the farm, curving across the road from west to east and then back
18. The payment of the cost of replacing or repairing taken facilities, where such cost
is less than the damage to the value of the land caused by the taking, has been adopted as
a method of making just compensation. Actually, this cost is only the decrease in the market
value of the property, in view of the owner's duty to curtail the damage from the taking.
Little v. Burleigh County, 82 N.V.2d 603, 613 (N.D. 1957) (lower court opinion reversed
on other grounds) ; Town of Oneida v. Hail, 105 S.W.2d 121 (Ct. App. Tenn. 1937) (cost
of retaining wall, to prevent further erosion caused by the town's action) ; United States
v. Martin, 267 F.2d 764, 771 (10th Cir. 1959) (Government project stopped overflow of
river, which was a source of natural irrigation. "An adequate irrigation system, or the cost
thereof, judicially determined, may indeed equal just compensation for the impairment of
the overflow rights.").
19. Housing Auth. of Shreveport v. Green, 200 Ia. 463, 474, 8 So.2d 295, 293 (1942).
Also see Housing Auth. v. Savannah Iron & Wire Works, Inc., 91 Ga. App. 881, 87 S.E.2d
671 (1955), in which the following charge to the jury was approved:
I further charge you, gentlemen, that the Constitutional provision as to just and
adequate compensation does not necessarily restrict the lessee's recovery to market
value. The lessee is entitled to just and adequate compensation for his property; that
is, the value of the property to him, not its value to the Housing Authority. The
measure of damages for property taken by the right of eminent domain, being com-
pensatory in its nature, is the loss sustained by the owner, taking into consideration
all relevant factors.
Id. at 884-85, 87 S.E.2d at 675 (italics omitted).
20. 348 S.W.2d 500 (Tenn. 1961).
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across to the west side of the road. The land around Evans' farm was being
developed as residential subdivisions, and the east half of Evans' land was
suitable for subdivision development. The west half, however, was subject to
flooding, and was suitable only for use as farm land. In the course of improving
the road, the county relocated the creek entirely on its western side, eliminat-
ing the need for two bridges which would have cost $25,000. Evans stied for
$20,000 in damages, the alleged decrease in the value of his property as a rid-
ing academy due to the lack of water.2 1 The Chancellor determined that the
diversion of the stream was a taking, and appointed a Master to assess the
compensation due Evans.2 2 The Master found that the "highest use value," or
market value, of the land was for subdivision purposes. The relocation of the
stream did not reduce this value. Therefore, the Master concluded, "the diver-
sion of Cooper Creek by the county has not resulted in any damage to the
complainant."2' The Master also found that water could be pumped from the
relocated creek to the east side of the road at a cost of $800-$1,000.24
The opinion of the Master was affirmed by the lower courts and by the
Tennessee Supreme Court.25 This court, taking up the challenges to the Mas-
ter's report separately, 26 agreed that the diversion of the stream by the county
21. This case is the culmination of a series of litigations in which Evans had been in-
volved. The first suit concerned an alleged oral contract with his brother involving an
adjacent piece of land, and an alleged inducing of his brother by a third party to breach
that contract. Evans was denied recovery, due to the Tennessee rule that a third party can
invoke the statute of frauds as a defense. Evans v. Mayberry, 198 Tenn. 187, 278 S.W.2d
691, rehearing denied, 279 S.W.2d 705 (1955). In the instant case, Evans was apparently
attempting to impede the development of subdivisions on the land surrounding his farm,
including the land involved in the former suit. He built fences that blocked the road at both
ends of his land. When these were torn down, he sued to enjoin the county from tearing
them down again. He also revived his claim of inducing a breach of contract, attempted to
enjoin the county, as a taxpayer, from constructing a road to subdivisions that were Just
beginning construction, and claimed damages resulting from the relocation of his stream.
Complaint of Appellant (on file at Yale Law Library). All of these claims for relief were
denied. Chancellor's Decree and Opinion, of the Court of Appeals (on, file at Yale Law
Library).
22. The full title of a master in Tennessee practice is Clerk and Master.
23. Clerk and Master's Report, p. 3 (on file at Yale Law Library).
24. Ibid.
25. The opinions of the lower courts have not been published. The Supreme Court
granted limited certiorari, and considered only the issue of compensation for the taking of
the stream. Memo to Counsel Limiting Certiorari, March 10, 1961 (on file at Yale Law
Library). The opinion of the Supreme Court was written by Judge Tomlinson, who also
wrote the opinion in Evans v. Mayberry, 198 Tenn. 187, 278 S.W.2d 691, rehearing denied,
279 S.W.2d 705 (1955).
26. There is no indication in the opinion that the court either viewed the situation
presented as a whole or analyzed the probable effect of its decision. Apparently, the court
assumed it was applying standard doctrines to the case, bringing the situation created by
the action of the county to its logical conclusion.
This is, perhaps, excusable in view of the failure by counsel to fully present the problem
in their briefs-appellant proceeds primarily on a trespass theory; appellee argues that tile
findings of the Master, Chancellor, and Court of Appeals should be binding. (Briefs on file
at Yale Law Library.)
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was a taking of Evans' property. On the subject of compensation, the Court
stated that market value is the standard by which damages are assessed, unless
the use is one peculiar to the owner, and rejected Evans' contention that his
riding academy is such a use.- Then, using the objective standard of market
value, the Court found that Evans had suffered no damage from the taking.as
Finally, the Court rejected the solution of paying Evans IMO-$1,000, the cost
of replacing the diverted water, on the ground that to allow this cost as the
measure of damages in this case would be to establish a dangerous precedent. -O
The necessary effect of denying any compensation to Evans for the taking
of his stream is to make it more difficult for him to continue his use of the land
as a riding academy.ao Evans must either bear the cost of installing a pump
in order to continue his prior use, find another use, or sell his land for residen-
27. The court rejected Evans' argument by stating that "any other owner, as well as
Evans, could operate a riding academy on the 43 acres. So its use is not one peculiar to
Evans." 348 S.W.2d at 505. Though Evans' use might not be one that is peculiar to the
owner, the Court's reliance on this rationale robs this exception to the generally used stand-
ard of market value of all meaning, for even a church or a railroad station could be operated
on the same property by a different person. A case falling within the peculiar use exception
is Southern Ry. v. City of Memphis, 126 Tenn. 267, 148 S.W. 662 (1912) (part of railroad
yard taken).
28. The court stated, correctly, that the usual measure of damages in cases of taking of
riparian rights is the difference in value of the riparian lands before and after the taking,
and found that by this measure Evans has not been damaged. 348 S.W.2d at 506. This
measure of compensation has been adopted because of the extreme difficulty of evaluating
a stream of water, per se. It is used as the standard most likely to compensate the owner
for thie damage done to him by the taking. An example of a case where it serves this pur-
pose is Albaugh v. Mount Shasta Power Corp., 9 Cal. 2d 751, 73 P.2d 217 (1937). The
Tennessee court did not, however, examine the reason for the rule, but seemed merely to
apply it as an ironclad standard. Such application is incorrect, for the rule is not an ab-
solute test. Compensation has been based on the intrinsic value of the water, i.e., its value
as water. Whitmore v. Utah Fuel Co., 42 Utah 470, 482, 131 Pac. 907, 912 (1913) (Com-
pensation set by the value of the water to the owner, in, view of all the purposes for which
he is using it. And note Straup, J., concurring: "So in estimating the value of the water I
think the plaintiff should be permitted to show, not only the uses which he had made of
the water, but also the uses which naturally and ordinarily could have been made of it.").
Water has also been evaluated for its utility as a flowing stream. King v. Board of Council
of City of Danville, 107 S.W. 1189 (Ct. App. Ky. 1908) (Plaintiff entitled to damages for
diversion of stream, which prevented him from operating his mill, though there wvas no
market for the products of the mill.). Finally, damages in a riparian taking case have been
based on the cost of replacing the water. See United States v. Martin, 267 F.2d 764 (10th
Cir. 1959) (discussed in note 18 supra).
29. 348 S.W.2d at 506-07. As the cost of replacing the water on Evans' land is con-
siderably less than the alleged loss in the value of the land as a riding academy after the
taking, this cost of replacement would be the correct measure of damages in, this case. See
note 18 supra. The court based its rejection of this measure of damages on the rationale
that to allow the cost of replacing water to be the general rule would lead to ridiculous
results in many cases, as where the water level of a river is lowered.
30. Whereas Evans formerly could turn his horses loose and allow them to water them-
selves, it is now necessary either to bridle each horse and lead him across the road to be
watered or to build a pump for conducting water to the east side of the road.
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tial development, its highest economic use. If a "zoning out" of Evans' equine
establishment was one of the objectives of the county in relocating the stream,
to allow the community to accomplish this objective through a partial taking
seems highly questionable. 31 True, the community could have passed a zoning
ordinance requiring that the land be used for residential purposes; but con-
stitutional standards of due process require that zoning ordinances making an
existing use nonconforming must provide a reasonable time, usually a period
of years, between passage of the ordinance and the required termination date ;o"
failure to allow such a period is a denial of due process-a taking of property
without just compensation.38 The rationale is that the allowance of a reason-
able time and the creation of a virtual monopoly during this period will permit
amortization of the loss resulting from the termination. 4 The change from
stable to residence could also have been achieved through a taking of the entire
tract of land, followed by a sale of the land for residential development. In the
absence of other circumstances, however, a taking for the purpose of inducing
highest economic use might not have fulfilled the public purpose requirement
of eminent domain.3, Thus allowing the partial taking of the property in this
31. The "zoning out" would occur if, as a result of increased costs, Evans sold his
land for residential development.
32. See, e.g., Baltimore, Md., Ordinance 711, 13(d) (May 21, 1953) (5 years); City
of Buffalo, N.Y., Ordinances, ch. LXX § 18 (1953) (3 years),
33. See Adams v. Kalamazoo Ice & Fuel Co., 245 Mich. 261, 264, 222 N.W. 86, 87
(1928) ("The legitimate purpose of a zoning ordinance ... is to preserve and not to dis-
rupt existing conditions.") ; Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1931)
(Ordinance requiring termination of the use of property as a hospital for the mentally 1II
held unconstitutional.) ; cf. City of Plainfield v. Borough of Middlesex, 69 N.J. Super. 136,
173 A.2d 785 (1961); Town of Somers v. Comarco, 308 N.Y. 537, 127 N.E.2d 327 (1955)
(Ordinance preventing sand and gravel pit operators to get a permit before continuing
their non-conforming use held "to deprive the defendants of a 'vested' right . . ."). It Is
interesting to note that in these cases the only property being taken is a use of the land.
34. See Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42 (1958) (note dis-
senting opinion of Van Voorhis, J., discussing rationale of "amortization"). The rationale
of "amortization" had early expression in Note, 9 U. Ci. L. REv. 477 (1942).
35. Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1953), interpreting
the District'of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, held that land could be taken and
resold to a private person only where the taking is necessary to eliminate or prevent a slui.
This holding was modified in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). The Court held that
making an area aesthetically consistent was a valid purpose of eminent domain condemina-
tion, and that a private party could be designated by Congress as the agency of redevelop-
ment. The scope of this holding is limited, however, in that the general area involved had
been determined to be "blighted."
In the instant case ', it is a close question as to whether Evans' land could be condemned
and resold for residential development. Even if it did fulfill the requirement of public pur-
pose, the county would have to make a major, though temporary, outlay of capital to
accomplish such a goal, and it has not indicated a willingness to do so,
An interesting contrast to this is provided by the planning acts of some metropolitan
areas in England, which make provision for the development agency to buy up land near
an improvement and then to sell it for development, thus realizing for itself the increase in




case to have the effect of discouraging its present use is to permit the county
to achieve an objective, indeed if it has such an objective,3 0 without an amor-
tization period, as would be required in the case of an exercise of the zoning
power, or without affording the landowner an opportunity to challenge the
premise that the overriding public interest warrants this encroachment, as
would be necessary in the case of a total taking.
The court in Evans, however, may have been influenced by doctrines embedded
in eminent domain law, which seemingly preclude recovery in the Evans situa-
tion. The fifth amendment's guarantee, "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation," has been construed to afford protection
only to a right in ren, not in personam, and therefore the damage resulting
from the taking is to be measured in terms of injury to property, rather than
to the property owner. The actual use being made of property is considered to
be a personal right and thus not subject to the requirement of compensation.aT
But many cases hold, especially where another measure of damages would be
inadequate, that the value the owner is entitled to recover is to be determined
in view of the particular use to which the land is in fact put.a8 The due process
requirement of reasonable time before elimination of a nonconforming use in
zoning law further indicates that enjoyment of actual use is a property right
worthy of judicial protection.39 Moreover, present use, not potential or pos-
36. The clear purpose of the county in this case was to improve the road at the lowest
cost. Viewed in this light, any effect of the taking on land use would seem to be incidental.
The very building of a road that was not required by the previous land use in the area may
indicate approval of the new land use, but there are also indications that the county may
have approved of Evans' riding academy. The zoning of and the tax assessment on Evans'
land were both conducive to his present use. While it is true that such policies are generally
formulated for a whole community, rather than in relation to one land-owner, they can be
used as instruments of land planning to indicate disapproval of a relatively specific use of
land. See generally Comment, Municipal Real Estate Taxation as an Instrmnt For Cain-
munity Planning, 57 YALE LJ. 219 (1947).
The seemingly incidental effects may in fact be related to community concern with land
use. Presumably, a minimum community goal is to have property put to a use for which
it is at least moderately suited. Beyond this, if the community is not indifferent, it may
have various positive objectives. It may want to have all land put to its highest use, as
determined by the market place. The widespread use of zoning, which frequently causes
land to be used at less than its highest use, indicates that the community often xishes to
have other values, as well as those of the market place, influence land use. The authorities
may also have an interest in retaining open space-either for its present qualities or to
anticipate future needs.
37. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
38. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
39. See notes 31-34 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Father Basil's Lodge v. City of
Chicago, 393 Ill. 246, 65 N.E2d 805 (1946).
"Property" has been defined to include every interest anyone may have in any and
every thing that is the subject of ownership by man, together with the right to freely
possess, use, enjoy or dispose of the same; and this right of user, which is part of
the property right guaranteed by the constitutions cannot be wholly taken away or
limited by the State except in so far as it may become necessary for the individual
rights to yield to the higher and greater law of the best interests of the people.
393 Ill. at 256, 65 N.E2d at 812.
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sible uses, is often considered in determining whether a particular interference
is to be classified as a taking.40 These cases may be viewed as a tacit admission
that the value of property and the value owing to a particular use cannot be
separated, and thus that damage to property and damage to use are in this
sense identical. This is not to say that the distinction between a loss due to an
interference with use and injury resulting from a taking of property is no longer
operative in the law of eminent domain, but that injury to use is in some situa-
tions compensated, however obliquely.
Since the bar to compensation presented by traditional doctrines of eminent
domain law has often proved to be illusory, and since a partial taking of prop-
erty presents considerations not involved in a total taking situation, it would
seem that courts should award damages to actual use for a partial taking of
property utilized at less than its maximum economic use.41 Ideally, the purpose
40. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) in which the taking of an air
space easement over Causby's land is discussed primarily in terms of his use of the land
as a chicken farm; cf. Erie County v. Fridenberg, 221 N.Y. 389, 117 N.E. 611 (1917) (well
on plaintiff's land, dried up by blasting on other taken property, was also "taker").
Other essentially tortious acts of government have also been classified as takings, See
Steinle v. City of Cincinnati, 142 Ohio St. 550, 53 N.E.2d 800 (1944) (escape of sewage
was a taking of property, recovery denied on other grounds) ; City of Mansfield v, Balliett,
65 Ohio St. 451, 63 N.E. 86 (1902) (pollution of stream was a taking).This type of devia-
tion from the strict doctrines of property and taking might be explained as merely an
abandonment in substance of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a doctrine that has been
viewed with increasing disfavor. See Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211,
11 Cal. Rpts. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No.
302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959); Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States,
29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1363 (1954). Such a view may also indicate an increased willingness to
saddle the state, rather than any one individual, with various costs of state activities.
41. A situation similar to Evans would exist where a partial taking results in severance
damages to the present use of the property, but not to the highest use.
Town of Slaughter v. Appleby, 235 La. 324, 103 So. 2d 461 (1958), illustrates such a
situation. A strip of land through Slaughter's farm was taken for a road, impeding access
from one part of the farm to another. The farm had a highest use as a residential sub.
division, and the taking caused no severance damages to this use. The court allowed an
award based on the market value of what was taken, but refused to allow any award for
severance damages.
True, defendants' witnesses were of the belief that severance damages might result,
they stating that the dividing of the tract might adversely affect defendants' live-
stock and farming operations.... But obviously if a fixing of the value of the land
taken is to be predicated on its potential residential use (as defendants contend for
here) the determination of severance damages must be based on the same usage.
Id. at 330-31, 103 So. 2d at 464.
The resulting situation is one in which, if Slaughter wishes to continue his present use
of the land, he will have to bear the burden of severance damages himself.
Another similar situation could arise as follows: A owns 100 acres of land which he
operates as a farm. His land is located ten miles from Downtown, and is connected with
Downtown by a rough paved road. His land is farm or marginal subdivision land, and has
a market value of $500 an acre. The state builds a superhighway from Downtown through
A's farm, taking twenty acres of his land. As a result of the new road, and the consequent
improved access to Downtown, his land is now prime subdivision land and has a market
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of compensation for any taking is to minimize the effect of the taking on the
property owner.2 Where land used for any particular purpose is taken in its
entirety, market value is usually adequate to minimize the effect of the taking,
since, theoretically at least, the award enables the owner to purchase other land
and thus to resume his prior use elsewhere. Moreover, an award based upon
market value does not penalize him for using his property at less than its
maximum economic use. However, where only a part of the property is taken
and the damage to use is greater than the decrease in market value,"3 applica-
tion of the market value standard renders continuance of its present use more
burdensome. Thus, it not only penalizes the owner for not using his land at its
highest use but also fails to minimize the effect of the taking. Where only a part
of the property is taken a remedy directed at actual maintenance of the owner's
chosen use, not merely a monetary equivalent, is possible and frequently feasi-
ble. By awarding compensation based upon the amount necessary to enable the
owner to continue his prior use, the effect of the taking may be abated. Al-
though compensating the owner in this manner may result in a greater cost to
the state than that required by the market value standard, preservation and
encouragement of individual volition in the use of property-a right well pro-
tected in other areas of the law u-would seem to justify this additional cost.
Increasing limits placed upon private volition do not gainsay the importance
of this value, but merely reflect the increasing needs of the community. Al-
though other community goals compete with the right of an individual freely to
use his property, the goal of having land put to its highest economic use would
not seem to be one of these.45 Indeed many of the recognized uses of zoning
value of $600 an acre. In a state where the increase in the value of the remainder may be
set off against the award, A would receive $2,000. However, based upon its value as farm
land, which is established by the producing capacity of the land, A would feel that he has
lost $10,000 worth of land. The only way that A can, become whole is to sell his land for
subdivision purposes. That such a case could occur can be seen from the following state-
meat:
The final inquiry as to the compensation to be awarded, if any, is the difference
between the value of the entire tract immediately before the taking and the value
of the part of the tract remaining after the taking, giving effect to any enhancement
in value of the part remaining resulting from construction of the road. If the part
remaining is worth as much as or more after completion of the project than the
entire tract was worth immediately before the taking, the landowner has sustained
no damage and is not entitled to any compensation.
Morgan County v. Hill, 257 Ala. 658, 660, 60 So. 2d 838, 840 (1952) ; accord, Robinson v.
State Highway Comm'n, 249 N.C. 120, 105 S.E2d 287 (1958).
42. See notes 6-7 supra and accompanying text.
43. In some situations the decrease in the market value of the remainders will be greater
than the damage to the less-than-highest use of the property. See, e.g., Herndon v. Pulaski
County, 196 Ark. 284, 117 S.W.2d 1051 (1938). In. such cases, the decrease in market value
will, naturally, constitute the award.
44. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
45. The market value standard itself generally operates to protect a less-than-highest
use. See note 10 mipra and accompanying te.\-t.
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and eminent domain are designed to prevent land from being used in accord-
ance with the dictates of the market place.46
Although courts are understandably reluctant to depart from a standardized
and manageable method of damages, such as market value, the cost of restoring
the property owner to his former position generally may be easily ascertained.
As applied to the situation in the Evans case, the cost of installing a pump to
furnish water to his horses, $800-$1,000, would be the amount needed to enable
him to continue his prior use without suffering any loss from the county's
action. 47 However, in awarding such costs, there is the possibility of the prop-
erty owner obtaining a profit as a result of the taking. For instance, if Evans,
after receiving the award, was to sell his land at a price determined by its
potential use as subdivision land, the amount he receives as compensation for
injury to his prior use would result in a "windfall.1 48 But this problem can
easily be avoided by conditioning payment of the award on the property owner's
use of the money to restore or maintain the present use of his property. 49
Arguably, where the repair cost is considerable, it would be economically
wasteful to restore the owner to his former use. A court could therefore con-
clude that such compensation is not constitutionally required. But where it is
impractical to continue the former use, or unreasonable for the property owner
46. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1920) (property
valuable for industrial potential zoned residential) ; Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Town-
ship, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952) (minimum size of dwellings); cf. State v. Wieland,
269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955) (ordinance requiring approval of architecture of all
new buildings).
47. Analogous situations are described in note 41 supra. In a case involving a sever-
ance, either the cost of repairs (probably the cost of building an underpass) or the money
value of the inconvenience caused would determine the award. In a case involving set-off
benefits that only accrue to the highest use, the award might be based on the earning power
of the taken land.
Estimates of such damages occur frequently in partial taking cases arising In rural
settings. See, e.g., Hibbets v. Johnson, 342 S.W2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App.), rcv'd on othcr
grounds, 350 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. 1961) ; Farr v. State Highway B3d., 122 Vt. 156, 166 A.2d
187 (1960) ; Skinner v. Polk County, 250 Iowa 1264, 98 N.W.2d 749 (1959) ; State Roads
Comm'n v. Berry, 208 Md. 461, 118 A.2d 649 (1955) ; also, see Note, Entent Domain:
Compensation for Partial Taking of Farm Land in Constructing Limited-Access High-
ways, 42 MINN. L. REv. 106 (1957).
48. Evans had already sold some of his land at the time of the appeal, and the court
had knowledge of this fact. "A few lots thereon have already been sold." 348 S.W.2d at 502,
Thus, the possibility of a windfall may have been an unmentioned factor in the court's
decision.
49. In Evans, the court could have decreed a payment of $800-$1000 conditioned oil
Evans having installed a pump. In situations where the detriment to present use is in terms
of inconvenience or lost earnings, rather than repairs, compensation might be made by an-
nual payments. If the property owner terminated his less-than-highest use, the payments
would cease. Such a method of compensation finds an analogy in Equitable Life Assurance
Soc. v. Branham, 250 Ky. 472, 63 S.W.2d 498 (1933), in which an award for personal
injuries was ordered paid in monthly installments, with payments to be terminated if the
injured party recovered within the three-year payment period, as well as in awards of
alimony and in workmen's compensation.
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to insist on such continuance, some award would still seem to be necessary to
compensate the owner for the injury resulting from the taking. Although the
market value of the property may not be affected by the taking, the owner is
deprived of the fruits of his investment in the property from the date of the
taking until the property can reasonably be sold at its full market value. Pay-
ment, therefore, for lost profits or interest on his investment during this period
should be a constitutional minimum of just compensation.50
50. In a partial taking where the owner is forced to change his use or sell his property,
he receives neither interest from the date of the taking on the compensation awrarded, nor
the amortization period required in ordinances terminating nonconforming uses, see notes
32-34 mipra. Therefore, it would seem necessary to compensate him for his lost profits or
interest during the period between the taking and the sale.
